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Abstract. 
This paper examines the area of interaction between the psychiatric and legal 
professions, with particular reference to the insanity defence. After a general 
discussion of some of the issues concerned with psychiatry in the courtroom, it 
discusses in detail the history and modem application of the insanity defence, and 
the well known M'Naughten rules. These rules are in widespread use in the 
English speaking world, and the paper discusses them in general terms, with 
1 
limited reference to particular jurisdictions. The central importance of the concept 
of disease of the mind is examined, with emphasis on the definitional problems 
associated with it. A number of attempts made by the courts to define disease of 
the mind are examined, and the inadequacy of these attempts are detailed. The 
'cognitive' and the less commonly applied 'volitional' arms of the M'Naughten test 
are discussed, as well as the special case of personality disorder. The options for 
reforming the insanity defence are examined, and are followed by some concluding 
comments. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, and annexures) 
comprises approximately nine thousand words. 
1. Psychiatry in the Courtroom. 
1. 1. Giving evidence. 
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Psychiatry probably has more to do with the law than any other single branch of 
medicine. Forensic psychiatrists are employed extensively in civil as well as 
criminal proceedings, testifying not just on insanity defences but a wide range of 
other issues, such as emotional harms and fitness to plead. Their role is not just to 
advise the Court of the bare bones of a person' s mental state, but to help the Court 
grasp a deeper understanding of their motivations and understanding of reality. 
There are two particular ethical principles a forensic psychiatrist must observe 
when making an assessment that will be given in evidence. These are 'dual agency' 
and 'uniform skepticism'. 
When a psychiatrist gives testimony, it is vital that he or she is not involved in the 
management and treatment of the accused, as an unacceptable conflict of interest 
will arise. Supporting the case for one side or the other is inconsistent with making 
judgments in a different context motivated only by the desire to treat. Furthermore, 
the accused is entitled to know that his or her confidences will be used only for 
treatment purposes. This is the problem of ' dual agency'. Breaches of the dual 
agency principle may well destroy the therapeutic relationship the accused and the 
doctor originally had, and make it difficult for the accused to trust a doctor again. 
It can also unfairly influence the jury if a person' s doctor gives evidence against 
him, or is forced to admit damaging facts under cross examination. The attitude of 
the jury may well be that if the accused ' s own doctor will not stand by him, his 
guilt is obvious. 
It may well be tempting to ask the treating psychiatrist to give evidence on the 
grounds that he or she already knows the case, and time and money can therefore 
be saved. But the attitude one brings to a therapeutic relationship is entirely 
different from the impartial one required by the Court, and appropriate testimony 
can only be given by a doctor who is not involved. 
Uniform skepticism refers to the attitude of the assessing psychiatrist. The doctor 
must approach the case in a skeptical frame of mind, weighing the evidence 
carefully, and being aware of the interest the accused has in skewing his findings . 
No finding can be assumed until it is proven. 
The late Bernard Diamond, a distinguished forensic psychiatrist, suggested the 
following principles should be observed by psychiatrists in the court room: 1 
• The testifying psychiatrist must clearly distinguish between his own 
idiosyncratic views and those of his colleagues. 
1 Diamond B. The forensic psychiatrist:Consultant versus activist in legal doctrine. Bull Am 
Acad Psychiatry Law 20 : 119-132, 1992. 124. 
+ He or she must not claim results that have not been replicated by others or 
accepted by the profession, or at least by a substantial part of it. 
+ Content and length of the examination must conform to the profession' s 
standards; often it is necessary to go beyond the patient interview and consult 
significant others, like parents and spouses. This is particularly pertinent where 
hard pressed state agencies will not pay for an extensive evaluation. In such 
circumstances, Diamond recommends the psychiatrist must withdraw. 
• The confidence level of the psychiatrist ' s opinion must always be stated. 
1.2 Public attitudes 
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The insanity defence rarely succeeds in contested cases, and various reasons 
relating to psychiatric practice can be advanced as to why this might be so. The 
stereotype persists of psychiatry as unscientific, overly reliant on subjective 
observations and even more subjective interpretations of their meaning. Juries 
whose attitude has been formed by controversial high profile cases may well warm 
to legal argument suggesting that psychiatric testimony is imprecise and unreliable. 
The general public' s perception of forensic psychiatry' s role is usually taken from a 
few sensational cases, such as that of John Hinkley, who caused a public outcry 
when he was found not guilty by reason of insanity for shooting President Reagan. 
It is often the case that specialised testimony is treated skeptically by the general 
public, when they perceive that it has led to a serious criminal being ' let off . 
Juries can also be influenced by the fear, usually groundless, that a finding of 
insanity will result in a dangerous person being put back on the street . There can 
also be the problem in some jurisdictions that a lack of funds may prevent defence 
experts conducting the expensive business of a thorough evaluation (including 
discussions with relatives and other doctors) to rebut the prosecution. 
Concerns about the influence of psychiatric testimony in the post Hinkley early 
1980s led the United States Congress to enact several provisions to limit the scope 
of psychiatric evidence and its potential to confuse the jury. Rule 704 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence was modified to prevent an expert witness stating a 
conclusory opinion on whether the accused was insane. This reflects the position in 
most other jurisdictions, where expert testimony is limited to descriptions of the 
accused' s mental state, and the Court reserves for itself the final decision on 
insanity. Congress also codified Federal insanity law with a version of the 
M 'Naughten rules. 
1. 3 Scientific standards 
Historically, psychiatry has often had a strained relationship with other branches of 
medicine, particularly prior to the treatment revolutions of the 1950s, as its guiding 
principles were seen by outsiders as unscientific . This has also affected its 
relationship with the law, which sought objective and verifiable opinions that 
psychiatrists often could not provide. 
Psychiatry in the modern world is considerably more scientific than it used to be, 
particularly since internationally standardised definitions of psychiatric illnesses 
became widely adopted. These definitions are provided by DSM IV (DSM stands 
for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual), which has become the working 'bible' of 
psychiatric practice. Since DSM IV was developed there has been more 
consistency between different psychiatrists, with less room for disagreement for 
the lawyers to make hay with. It is now more likely that defence and prosecution 
experts will find themselves in agreement, so the case can end in a stipulated 'not 
guilty by reason of insanity', and a courtroom battle can be avoided. 
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Psychiatry has also made considerable progress in the last thirty years with 
understanding some of the biological disturbances that underlie psychiatric illness, 
and with developing drugs to treat them. There is now far less reliance on complex 
psychoanalytical explanations of mental disturbance, and more on biological ones. 
It is ironic that while psychiatry has moved in recent times to become more 
objective and consistent, more like other sciences, the other sciences have been 
moving in the opposite direction. There is now a widespread acceptance in the 
'hard' sciences like physics that the Newtonian concept of fixed relationships and 
predictable outcomes has considerable limitations, and that better results are 
obtained from models based on uncertainty and probability. Such models are 
concerned with multiple causes, uncertain outcomes, and the value of subjective 
perceptions. In other words, they have many of the features of the hard sciences' 
poor cousins, psychology and psychiatry. 
At the same time the criminal law has also moved away from rigid definitions, and 
has progressively allowed some of psychiatry's less precise concepts to be 
introduced into evidence. Battered woman syndrome, for instance, is a relatively 
modern concept, and has at various times supported defences of duress and self 
defence, as well as insanity. Similar developments have occurred with post 
traumatic stress disorder, and repressed memories. The relatively modern 
explosion of cases dealing with sexual assault on children has raised complex 
issues about memory, affect and credibility, all areas where psychiatric and 
psychological testimony is indispensable. These are also areas where the medical 
profession is feeling its way just as much as the courts, and strong disagreements 
exist within its ranks about the nature of these phenomena. 
As science in general becomes more concerned with complex systems where 
causality is unable to be pinned down exactly, the law has become less willing to 
insist on reductionist standards of explanation. From the States comes the case of 
Daubert and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 where the U.S . Supreme 
Court ruled that scientific testimony can be admitted irrespective of the consensus 
of accepted principles in the field . The case concerned the drug Bendectin, and 
whether it had caused birth defects. The defendants produced numerous published 
2 U.S. Sup. Court No. 92-102 (1992) 
studies showing that it had not. The plaintiffs sought to admit evidence from well 
qualified experts who claimed otherwise, but represented a minority opinion in 
their field . In their ruling, the Justices overturned a seventy year old standard that 
expert testimony must have gained general acceptance in the particular field to 
which it belongs. The ruling recognises the changing nature of science. Where the 
courts could once refer to the accepted consensus in a field, they now have to 
acknowledge multiple points of view. 
There remains, however, a significant part of psychiatry that relies on the 
subjective impressions of the examiner to form conclusions, in a way that would 
not be accepted by 'bench science' . This fact of life for psychiatrists can be a 
means of undermining a psychiatric testimony when attacked in Court. It is 
necessary for courts and the public to accept that this is a legitimate part of 
psychiatric testimony. 
2. The modern insanity test and its history. 
Since at least the thirteenth century the law has recognised in some form or 
another that allowances must be made for people who are not fully responsible for 
their actions because of mental illness. 
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Some authorities3 claim that when the aspects of insanity emphasised by the law 
are dissected, the common impulse usually relates to the danger the accused poses 
to society if he or she is released. This common denominator reflects the whole 
raison d' etre of the insanity defence, which is to provide for people who are not 
criminally or morally responsible for their actions, but who still require restraint for 
society' s sake. 
The modem insanity defence based on the M 'Naughten rules has antecedents 
reaching back to the thirteenth century. There was no insanity defence per se prior 
to Norman English Law. An insane offender would not be tried, but his family 
would be required to pay compensation to the family of the victim. Early 
formulations, such as that provided by Bracton4, were narrow in their focus and 
equated mental illness sufficient to defend a criminal act as rendering the accused 
on the same level as children or animals. Bracton considered an insane person to 
be: 
'one who does not know what he is doing, who is lacking in mind and reason, and who is not far 
removed from the brutes '. 
In 1723, in R v Amold, the judge directed the jury that in order to be found insane: 
'a man must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory and does not know what he is 
doing, no more than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast '
5
. 
3 McSherry, B. Defining what is a 'Disease of the Mind': The Untenability of Current Legal 
Interpretations. Journal of Law and Medicine October 1993 . 
4 Henri de Bracton, On Laws and Customs of England 
5 (1724) 16 St. Tr 695 at 765 (emphasis added) 
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The courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries continued much the same 
line, and generally permitted only the most obviously deranged individuals to be 
excused from serious crimes6. However, at the same time a development of the 
rule can be traced, whereby it was recognised that incarcerating deranged people 
did not solve any deterrent function, which was considered the primary purpose of 
punishment. Accordingly, when James Hadfield was tried in 18007 for attempting 
to assassinate the King, he was acquitted on the basis that a delusion had directed 
his actions, though no florid and intractable derangement was present. 
This case created something of a stir, when it was recognised that there was no 
place for offenders like Hadfield to go, when they were acquitted of any criminal 
responsibility, but continued to present a threat to society. 
Almost all the common law tests in use around the world today are some variation 
on the M'Naughten principles, which were formulated by the House of Lords in 
1843 . The infamous Mr.M'Naughten suffered from a paranoid delusion that Tory 
politicians were plotting to harm him, and he shot the British Prime Minister 's 
secretary as a result. When the case reached the House of Lords, Tindal LCJ 
gave what is now regarded as the classic definition of the legal view of insanity:8 
' ... to establish a defence on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, 
he did not know that what he was doing was wrong'. 
This statement represented the culmination of a century of development of the law 
relating to insanity. Previous definitions had dwelt on a deprivation of reason, a 
want of understanding, and inability to distinguish good and evil. It has become 
widely adopted around the world, and there are now only a very few jurisdictions9 
that treat all perpetrators of crimes equally, without provision for any sort of 
insanity plea. 
Although this statement still forms the basis of most contemporary legal tests, it 
has been expanded in some jurisdictions to cover contingencies not captured by 
simple lack of understanding. The M'Naughten rule survives in the ' cognitive' arm 
of modern tests, while the 'volitional' arm is a more recent development. 
The insanity defences in use around the world tend to follow similar formulas, and 
for the purposes of this paper the generic principles will be discussed without 
detailed reference to particular jurisdictions. 
Practically without exception, the legal tests of insanity have followed the 
McNaughten rules ' requirement that some disease of the mind must be present, 
6 R v Ferrers (1760) 19St Tr 885; R v Had.field (1800) 27 St Tr 1281; R v Bellingham Coll Lun 
636; 
7 Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, University of California Press, 1972. 138. 
8 (1843) 10 Cl & Finn 200, 8 ER 718, (1843-60] All ER Rep 229 (HL). 
9 The States of Montana and Idaho in the USA. 
and that this disease is pivotal to, and not incidental to, the commission of the 
offence. This is to ensure that: 
' ... mere excitability of a normal man, passion, even stupidity, obtuseness, lack of self control 
and impulsiveness do not give rise to the insanity defence.' 
10 
One of the major problems for insanity defences is the inability of either the courts 
or the medical profession to define what a disease of the mind actually is, and this 
point is discussed in detail below. 
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Secondly, tests require either a cognitive arm, or a volitional arm, to be satisfied in 
addition to the presence of disease of the mind. The cognitive arm has two 
alternative parts: either the defendant did not understand the nature and quality of 
his actions, or that knowing this, he did not know that they were wrong 
(M'Naughten) . The volitional arm, which may be satisfied in addition to, or 
separate from the cognitive arm, requires that the defendant lacked the ability to 
control his actions, or in other words, was acting under some irrepressible impulse. 
3. Use of the insanity defence 
There are several reasons why an accused will raise a defence of insanity: 
• To avoid the stigma of conviction (which would have to be balanced against the 
stigma of mental illness); 
• To avoid a lengthy prison sentence. This differs between jurisdictions, 
depending on the available penalties for the crime. Where, for instance, there is 
a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, an accused is more likely to raise 
the insanity defence than where there is sentencing discretion. For instance, 
when England introduced the defence of diminished responsibility, there was a 
marked reduction in the number of insanity verdicts.
11 Freiberg found, as one 
might expect, that there was a dramatic decline in the number of insanity 
verdicts after the abolition of capital punishment in Australia. 
12 
• Where it would be beneficial for the accused to receive psychiatric care in a 
mental institution rather than a prison; 
• Where the offender's mental illness is temporary and unlikely to recur; in this 
case, the offender may not be detained very long if the insanity plea is 
accepted.13 
10 Quoted in McSherry, Defining what is a "Disease of the Mind": The Untenability of Current 
Legal Interpretations. Journal of Law and Medicine, Voll. October 1993. 
11 N. Walker, Crime and Insanity in England, vol. l. University Press, Edinburgh 1968. 
12 A Freiberg,_Out of Mind, Out of Sight: The Disposition of Mentally Disordered Persons 
involved in Criminal Proceedings [19761 3 Mon. Law Rev. 134, 159. 
13 But see discussion in this paper that where the condition is unlikely to recurr, it is less likely to 
be accepted as a case of insanity. 
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Insanity pleas are by no means commonly invoked. The tests in common use 
around the world invariably set high standards and it is often only in cases of 
obvious insanity that they are used. There is no truth in the popular perception that 
the insanity plea is a soft option for serious criminals. For instance, one study of 
eight States in the US found the plea used in less than one percent of a 
representative sample of cases 14 . Furthermore, only 26% of these pleas were 
successful. According to Myths and Realities: A Report of the National 
Commission on the Insanity Defence (USA) , less than 0.2% (52 out of 32,000) 
defendants in New Jersey entered the insanity plea, and less than a third were 
successful. In New York City, only one in six or seven hundred criminal cases 
invoke the insanity plea. 15 
4. Disease of the mind. 
Insanity is a legal concept, not a medical one, and although psychiatrists are 
usually employed to describe a defendant's state of mind, it is the court that must 
decide whether the accused was insane. Mental illness by no means automatically 
meets the insanity test when it present, nor does it even meet it in a majority of 
cases. The great majority of people with mental illness are not insane in legal 
terms. 
Unfortunately, both the law and psychiatry lack an adequate definition of what a 
disease of the mind actually is, despite having spilled a lot of ink in the search for it 
over the last few hundred years, and despite the relevance such a definition would 
have to both fields of enquiry. 
A workable definition is important for not just for the application of legal tests, 
but for fairness at other stages of the judicial process, like sentencing and parole. 
Beyond the criminal law, the label can have far reaching implications. One can be 
deprived of liberty and other civil rights, like the right to refuse treatment, if the 
'mental illness' cap fits . It is obviously important that medicine and the law 
understand what is meant by the term. Yet where mental disease is referred to in a 
legal context, as with legislation, judgments, or instructions to a jury, the term is 
rarely given explicit definition. 
In the era of M 'Naughten, questions of science were seen in physical terms, and it 
was assumed that psychiatric phenomena were due to disturbances of brain 
function. It was expected that it was only a matter of time before medical science 
would elucidate the precise nature of these physical disturbances, and would give 
the law a solid hook to hang its legal tests on. With precise descriptions of brain 
disorder, the law would be able to determine with a high degree of accuracy when 
mental disease was present or absent, and the legacy this model has bequeathed to 
subsequent generations is a lasting emphasis on mental disease. 
Unfortunately, precise descriptions of brain disorder have not evolved with the 
march of science, and even with the most sophisticated modern technology, there 
14 Bulletin of the A merican Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 19, No 4, 1991. 
15 www.psych.org/public info/INSANI-1.HTM. 
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is no prospect of this changing in the foreseeable future. It is still the case, as it 
was a hundred years ago, that a definition of mental disease can only rest on the 
symptoms and signs observed in the patient. It is now appreciated that most mental 
disorder concerns the unnatural working of the mind, and not organic or structural 
deformity. (Some fine points can be argued here: must unnatural working of the 
mind not relate at some level to organic function? It depends on whether the mind 
is simply the sum of the parts of the brain (cells and chemicals) or something else. 
This question is not yet resolved, but most psychiatrists regard the mind as 
something apart from the brain). 
It is not suggested that a proper explanation of the causes of mental illness is 
necessary for the functioning of the law per se; if the concept can be adequately 
defined in other ways, the law can apply its tests and definitions, and safely leave 
the nuts and bolts to the medical profession. But where an alternative basis for the 
concept is lacking, the lack of abnormal physical phenomena in insane people 
becomes a stumbling block. 
Definitions in both medicine and law have tended more recently to use 
'dysfunction' in place of 'illness' or 'disease' to emphasise that the concepts are 
not analogous to purely physical disorders. 
It might be assumed that the question is essentially medical, and that psychiatrists 
could guide the courts, and advise, as the guardians of mental health sciences, 
when mental disease is present. However, psychiatric science is no more equipped 
than the law to rule on when a disease of the mind is present, particularly at the 
fringes of normal behaviour, which is where any dividing line must be drawn. 
It is exactly the same problem that bedevils any definition of health and disease. 
What is normal health? Is it something positive, or merely the absence of illness? 
If it is something positive, what is that? Does it concern, for instance, the ability to 
reach one's potential? In that case, laziness would constitute illness, and those 
born congenitally deformed would be considered normal. 
The question is comparable to defining 'normal' eyesight. An ophthalmologist can 
measure a person's visual acuity, but is no better equipped than anyone else to say 
what is 'normal'. What is adequate to drive a car may not be adequate for some 
occupations, what is inadequate to read small type may be adequate for walking 
down the street. What is acceptable in old age is a disorder for a youth. The 
definition of 'normal' vision is a legal one: what level is needed to drive safely or 
undertake any other task for which licensing is required. The point is that what is 
normal is not decided by the relevant medical specialists, but by experts in law and 
public policy, and is not made with reference to some fundamental property of the 
test, but to an arbitrarily defined standard. 
The same principles apply to defining mental disease, and experts in the field have 
long wrestled with their responsibilities on this question. One authority16 describes 
some of the solutions that have been proffered: 
16 Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, University of California Press, 1972. 
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• There is no such thing as mental disease; 
• Mental disease is psychosis but not neurosis; 
• Mental disease is any substantial mental disturbance dealt with by psychiatrists; 
• Mental disease is substantial social maladaption or incompetence; 
• Mental disease is the failure to realise one ' s nature, capacities or true self 
Neither the medical or the legal professions possesses fundamental criteria for 
accepting one state as mental illness and not another, and all criteria proffered can 
be seen to be inadequate. For instance, if prevailing social norms were the key, 
changing norms would leave the definition high and dry (homosexuality is a good 
example). If treatability were the key, (a stance the medical profession tends 
towards), none of the major psychoses would have constituted an illness prior to 
the 1950s. 
Furthermore, some authorities claim a workable definition simply isn' t available as 
the concept means different things for different purposes. A doctor ' s definition 
emphasises treatability, a sociologist's emphasises social functioning, and a 
lawyer' s emphasises awareness and responsibility. Each must seek definitions for 
their own purposes, which can and indeed must differ from one another, and these 
individual and diverging paths preclude a single universal solution. 
Could be accepted that a precise definition is not essential, given that 
commonsense ones can easily be invoked that are adequate for the purpose? 
Concepts like time and space lack easy definition, but that doesn't stop the terms 
being used in everyday parlance, as well as the upper reaches of theoretical 
physics. Courts are often expected to draw conclusions from imprecise and 
incomplete evidence, and seen in this light, maybe mental disease is not 
exceptional. 
5. Aspects of legal tests of 'disease of the mind'. 
McSherry17 describes three principles that have been developed by the courts to 
assist in determining the legal view of disease of the mind. These tests are of 
particular importance in distinguishing sane from insane automatism. 
• The recurrence test: a mental state which is likely to recur is a disease of the 
mind; 
• The internal/external test: A mental state arising within the accused' s mind is a 
disease of the mind, whereas a state arising from an external cause is not; 
17 McSheny, B. Defining what is a 'Disease of the Mind ': The Untenability of Current Legal 
Interpretations. Journal of Law and Medicine October 1993 . 17 
+ The sound/unsound mind test: similar to the external/internal distinction, this 
has been used deal with dissociative states. A disease of the mind exists where 
the mind was disturbed before being exposed to external stimuli, and does not 
react the same way a sound mind would. 
5. 1 Recurrence test. 
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The recurrence test has only been referred to in a small number of judgements, and 
was summed up by Lord Denning in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern 
Ireland' 8 : 
' any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur (emphasis 
added) is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be 
detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal '. 
Sholl J in R v Carter19 agreed, and said in his judgement: 
' potentiality of repetition ... might be regarded as a discrimination between cases of irrational 
behaviour due to some transient cause ... other than disease of the mind, and cases of irrational 
behaviour due to defective reason from disease of the mind'. 
Despite this, there are problems with the concept. It is entirely conceivable that a 
serious mental disorder may not recur, particularly with the modern treatments that 
are available for serious disturbances, as indeed is true by definition of the 
phenomena of temporary insanity. 
Also, conditions like epilepsy and hypoglycemia will be considered diseases of the 
mind on this test, although they are generally regarded to be outside its ambit, and 
they are eminently treatable. 
If recurrence matters, it can be argued that its importance lies with the sentencing 
stage of proceedings, and not the question of guilt. The recurrence test confuses 
the question of what should be done with an insane defendant with the entirely 
separate question of whether the accused's state of mind excuses his conduct. 
One authority2° has pointed out that if the recurrence test was overly relied on, 
then it would be more appropriate to direct the jury to determine whether they find 
the accused guilty of being dangerous in the future . 
5. 2 Internal/ external test. 
This was developed by Martin JA in the Canadian case of R v Rabey21 as follows: 
18 [1%31 AC 386 
19 [1959} VR 105 
2° Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand. Butterworths, 
Sydney, 1988. Pg 129. 
21 (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 461. 
' In general, the distinction to be drawn is between a malfunctioning of the mind arising from 
some cause that is primarily integral to the accused, having its source in his psychological or 
emotional make up, or in some organic pathology, as opposed to a malfunctioning of the mind 
which is the transient effect produced by some specific ex'temal factor such as, for example, 
concussion ' . 
The practical effect of this is to place behaviour arising from blows to the head, 
drugs, or hypnotism within the ambit of sane automatism, and not insanity. 
However, this test can create arbitrary distinctions, such as for instance, between 
hyper and hypoglycernia. 
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Hyperglycernia occurs in diabetics when they fail to take their insulin treatment, 
and their blood levels of glucose rise. Hypoglycernia occurs when an excess of 
insulin, or fasting, or an excess of alcohol, cause levels to fall . Both states can give 
rise to confused behaviour. 
In R v Quick 22 William Quick was charged with assaulting a patient at a mental 
hospital where he worked as a nurse. He was a diabetic, and on the day of the 
assault he had injected himself with insulin without having anything to eat 
afterwards, and had drunk alcohol. He claimed in court that he was suffering from 
hypoglycernia, and that this explained his uncharacteristic behaviour. The judge, 
Bridge J, ruled that this defence concerned factors internal to the accused (his 
diabetes) and therefore invoked the insanity defence. Mr. Quick then pied guilty. 
On appeal, the Judge' s ruling was overturned, as the court held that the 
hypoglycernia was caused by taking insulin and not by the diabetes ( diabetes per se 
causes abnormally high glucose levels) . The insulin was an external factor and 
could have given rise to the defence of sane automatism. 
However, in R v Hennessy 23, Andrew Hennessy was charged with driving while 
disqualified. He raised a defence of automatism on the basis that he was a diabetic 
who had not taken insulin for several days and that his behaviour was due to the 
resulting hyperglycernia. The judge ruled that the diabetes was responsible for his 
state of mind, and Mr. Hennessy changed his plea to guilty. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the judge' s reasoning and the conviction based on it. 
Lord Lane CJ ruled that hyperglycernia is an ' inherent defect ' which can be 
considered a disease of the mind. He stated that: 
' if it (hyperglycernia) does cause a malfunction of the mind, then the case may fall within 
24 M 'Naughten Rules ' . 
The conclusion of these two cases is that hyperglycernia from untreated diabetes is 
an internal factor, and therefore invokes the insanity defence, and hypoglycernia 
arising from over treated diabetes, is not. Diabetics who commit crimes are 
therefore likely to receive an unqualified acquittal if they over treat themselves 
22 (1983] 1 QB 910 
23 (1989) 1 WLR 287 
24 (1989) l WLR 287 at 293 
with insulin, and to find themselves in a mental hospital if they fail to take their 
medication altogether. 
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The same sort of problems arise with the phenomenon of sleep walking. In the 
Canadian case of R v Parks 25, Kenneth Parks killed his mother-in-law and 
wounded his father-in-law, and claimed afterwards that he was sleepwalking at the 
time. He pleaded a defence of automatism, based on the claim that he was 
sleepwalking. Five medical witnesses gave evidence that the accused was indeed 
sleepwalking at the time he committed the acts. The jury acquitted him of murder, 
and the judge acquitted him of attempted murder. 
The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court of 
Canada, claiming that the Court had erred in finding that sleepwalking was not a 
disease of the mind. Both appeals failed, and Parks' acquittal stood. 
In a similar case in England, R v Burgess, 26 Barry Burgess hit a friend on the head 
with a bottle and a video recorder, then attempted to strangle her. It was only 
when she cried out that he backed off and appeared to come to his senses. 
At his trial, his lawyer argued that Mr. Burgess was sleepwalking when the acts 
were committed, which entitled him to entitled to the defence of automatism. 
Medical evidence was brought to support this. The trial judge ruled that 
sleepwalking came under an insanity defence, and the jury returned a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The Appeal Court upheld this finding and Mr. Burgess 
was sent to a mental hospital. 
So in the case of Parks, sleepwalking was not considered to be a disease of the 
mind, and in Burgess it was. 
To cloud the waters even further, Lamer CJ and Cory J stated with respect to 
Parks, that while sleepwalking did not lead to a defence of insanity in that case, 
'this in not to say that sleepwalking could never be a disease of the mind, in another case on 
different evidence'. 27 
This allows the possibility that some conditions will be accepted and rejected as 
diseases of the mind on a case by case basis. 
5.3 Sound/unsound mind. 
The sound/unsound mind test is a variation of the internal/external factor test, and 
it was first developed in the Australian High Court in the case of R v Falconer. 28 
Gordon Falconer had a long history of violence to his wife and their daughters. 
After 30 years of marriage Mrs. Falconer separated from her husband and obtained 
25 R v Parks (1990) 56 CCC (3d)449 at 458. 
26 R v Burgess( l991) 2 WLR 1206 at 1209. 
27 (1992) 2 SCR 871 at 891. 
28 (1990) 171 CLR 30 
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a non molestation order to prevent him continuing to harass her. Despite the order, 
Mr. Falconer continued to see his wife and mentally and physically abuse her. On 
one of these occasions Mary Falconer shot and killed her husband with a shot gun 
kept in a wardrobe in the house. She had no recollection of what she had done, 
and only remembered ' coming to ' holding the gun with her husband 's body beside 
her. 
At the trial, the defense called two psychiatrists to give evidence that the accused 
had experienced a dissociative state, consistent with sane automatism. Both 
experts considered that the circumstances preceding the shooting were severe 
enough to produce a dissociative state, where, according to one of them: 
' part of [the accused's] personality would be sort of segmented and not functioning as a whole 
and she became disrupted in her behaviour, without awareness of what she was doing'. 29 
The Commissioner hearing the case ruled this evidence inadmissible and the 
accused was convicted. 
However, this was overturned on appeal, where the Western Australia Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that the evidence was admissible on the issue of 
voluntariness, and ordered a retrial. The Court agreed that the evidence did not 
come under the terms of insanity, but whether the firing of the gun was voluntary. 
Concerning sane versus insane automatism, the Justices ruled that the 
internal/external test was inadequate in relation to dissociation, and attempted to 
define when a dissociative state would lead to sane automatism and when it would 
lead to the insane variety. To this end, they drew on a judgement in R v Radford 30 
where King CJ addressed the issue of whether mental conditions stemming from 
' psychological blows' should be considered sane or insane automatism: 
'The significant distinction is between the reaction of an unsowtd mind ... on the one hand and 
the reaction of a sound mind ... on the other'. 
Gaudron J with regard to Falconer expressed a similar view: 
' The fundamental distinction is necessarily between those mental states which, although 
resulting in abnormal behaviour , may be experienced by normal persons as, for example ... a 
blow to the head, and those which are never experienced by or encountered in normal persons '. 31 
Adding to this, Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ proposed an objective test to 
the sound/unsound mind distinction: 
'The law must postulate a standard of mental strength which, in the face of a given level of 
psychological trauma, is capable of protecting the mind from malfunction to the extend 
prescribed in the respective definitions of insanity. That standard must be the standard of the 
ordinary person: if the mind' s strength is below that standard, the mind is infirm; if it is of or 
29 Ibid at 109 
30 919850 42 SASR 266. 
31 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 85. 
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above that standard, the mind is sound or sane. This is an objective standard which corresponds 
with the objective standard imported for the purpose of determining provocation' .32 
6. Cognitive arm. 
This test has two parts. The first part relates to the capacity of the defendant to 
know the 'nature and quality of his act or omission' . This is usually taken as more 
than the 'narrow physical action and its surrounding circumstances, and also 
encompasses the result, injury or damage that flows from the action'33 . This test is 
usually satisfied only by gross delusional states, such as those that occur in 
schizophrenia. It has been phrased by different authorities as referring to 'an insane 
mistake of fact' 34 or '[the defendant] could not appreciate the physical thing he 
was doing or its consequences'35. 
An oft quoted example of such gross disorder is where a person cuts another's 
throat believing he is cutting a loaf of bread. 
The second part of the test, which is an alternative to the 'nature and quality' 
grounds, is that the accused did not know his acts to be wrong. Wrong is 
understood in New Zealand and Australia to mean 'contrary to the ordinary 
principles of reasonable people'36 . 
The tests described above are those found in English law. Courts in the United 
States usually omit the nature-and -quality test and depend on the knowledge of 
wrongness to establish a plea of insanity. 
The majority of insane people retain an understanding of the nature and quality of 
their actions, and those that do not will usually lack the capacity for organised 
action they would require to commit an offense. In other words, they are so 
deranged that purposeful action is beyond them. It is the second part of the 
cognitive test that is most often invoked in court, the lack of knowledge of 
wrongness. 
The majority of people found not guilty by reason of insanity are in a situation 
where they understand what they are doing but possess a delusional reason for 
doing it . McNaughten himself fully understood that he was committing a murder, 
but believed in a delusional fashion that it was necessary for his self preservation. 
32 R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 85 . 
33 Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand. 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1988. 122. 
34 Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand. 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1988. 122. 
35 Howard C, Criminal Law, 4th Ed, Law Book Co, Sydney 1982, 333 . 
36 Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand. 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1988. Pg. 123 . 
It is not uncommon in psychotic states for people to believe they are acting as 
agents of God, or of some extra terrestrial force, or that they have to defend 
themselves against bizarre plots being hatched by others. 
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In these situations the courts usually take the view that the accused must be judged 
on what the law would have been had the facts of the delusion been real. So a man 
who kills another person he wrongly believes to be having an adulterous affair with 
his wife may not be acquitted on grounds of insanity, as his action would not have 
been lawful if his beliefs had been grounded in reality. But a person who genuinely 
believes himself an agent of the almighty may claim that his delusion excuses him. 
The heart of the cognitive arm of the insanity plea is the principle of mens rea, the 
guilty mind. There is a distinct difference between absence of mens rea by reason 
of insanity, and absence of mens rea on other grounds. In the latter case the 
accused is a responsible agent who acted without criminal intent. In the former 
case the accused lacks the status to be judged responsible for his actions; his state 
of mind renders questions of guilt or innocence superfluous. The absence of mens 
rea does not lead to a finding of innocence and a discharge, but to incarceration, 
albeit not for punitive reasons. 
7. Volitional arm. 
There are jurisdictions that recognise that the cognitive grounds alone do not 
cover all aspects of mental illness that might result in crime being committed. A 
person who understands the nature and quality of their acts may still lack the 
ability to control their actions. The cognitive criteria taken on their own exclude 
concepts such as emotions or mood, ( e.g. depression), or what one Justice termed 
the ' moral perversion of feelings unaccompanied by delusion' 37 . As one 
contemporary text describes it, the McNaughten based tests are: 
' ... for the most part thoroughly cognitive in emphasis and, arguably, fail to give adequate 
consideration to disorders of the will or emotions '. 38 
Some jurisdictions therefore recognize that an alternative to the cognitive arm is a 
volitional one: insanity that resulted from ' irresistible impulse, incapacity to 
conform to the law, or impaired emotional processes' 39. It is by no means universal 
that this arm is recognised. New Zealand law does not recognise it, nor do a 
number of American States, but most Australian States do. Its use is not endorsed 
by the American Psychiatric Association. 
The concepts can overlap. Inability to act calmly and reasonably might satisfy a 
jury that the accused lacked the ability to know what he was doing, as well as 
lacking ability to control his actions. In other words, where a person is deprived of 
control over volition, it is likely he will be deprived of one of the cognitive 
37 Frere v Peacock (1846) 1 Rob Eccl 442; 163 ER 1095. 
38 Simester and Brookbanks, 1998, Principles of Criminal Law, Brooker's Ltd, Wellington, New 
Zealand, pg. 268 . 
39 Campbell, I. Mental Disorder and the Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand. 
Butterworths, Wellington, 1988. Pg. 145. 
capacities as well . The law in these instances parallels the thinlcing in psychiatry, 
that aspects of one' s mental makeup like cognition and volition are interwoven 
with each other, and do not exist in separate boxes. 
Where criticism of the volitional test has arisen, it has centered on the jury's 
inability to distinguish between an impulse that could not be resisted and one that 
was not resisted. Yet a jury has to make this distinction whenever an issue of 
involuntarism is raised, and the task is not impossible. 
8. Local and global insanity. 
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A relatively recent development in the insanity defence, and in the wider question 
of diminished capacity, is the principle of distinct competencies, in other words the 
ability to be incompetent or insane with respect to some abilities but not others. 
Traditionally competence was all or nothing, but developments in both psychiatry 
and the law have rendered this model obsolete. 
On the psychiatric level, this concept can be traced back to Freud' s theories of 
conflict and dissociation, in combination with more modem principles such as the 
multiple personality disorder paradigm. The mind is best understood as 
differentiated phenomenon, not a unitary whole. Although the numerous different 
facets of the mind interact with each other, they can be disentangled in a 
psychiatric evaluation, so that the patient can be pronounced incompetent for some 
functions but not others. 
A man might kill his children because of the delusional belief they would be better 
off in heaven. He may well be able to distinguish right and wrong, and have a 
normal perception of reality, in all other respects except the respect in which he 
acted. 
Another example is white collar crime. Traditionally, the skill needed to embezzle 
money ruled out any consideration of the accused suffering any sort of impairment. 
However, it is increasingly recognised that congitive ability may persist when the 
mind is affected by depression or psychosis. 
9. The special case of personality disorder. 
One particular problem with the definition of insanity is the case of personality 
disorder. A personality disorder is defined by a contemporary authority40 as: 
'Disordered patterns of behaviour characterised by relatively fixed, inflexible and stylised 
reactions to stress ... other people and e>.1emal events regardless of e>.1ernal realities '. 
Personality disorder is a unique form of illness, if an illness it is, and represents the 
pinnacle of the mad versus bad dilemma. Other types of mental disease strike 
' normal ' people, and cause them to pass from a state of sanity into insanity. A 
personality disorder, by contrast, is a fixed and unchanging pattern of behaviour, 
40 Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, Sixteenth Edition, Merck Research Laboratories. 
that exists from birth, and by definition is intimately bound up with who a person 
is. Personality disorders are for life, and do not respond to any form of treatment. 
A psychopath is a working example. 
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Many jurisdictions, particularly in the United States, specifically exclude 
personality disorder from their definitions of mental illness. Other areas have case 
law rulings that personality disorder does not meet the definition of mental 
dysfunction. The question is whether this is fair and appropriate. 
Personality disorders are recognised by DSM IV and comprehensive descriptions 
of the different types are available. They seriously impair normal personal 
functioning . People suffer from them through no fault of their own. Where a 
person with a personality disorder commits a crime, could they not claim they have 
less intrinsic inhibition to commit crimes, through a grossly twisted and abnormal 
personality? 
The problem is whether people can claim diminished responsibility because of the 
way the are. There are many people who come before the courts, who do not meet 
the full criteria for personality disorder, who could nevertheless claim that their 
personal make up makes them less respectful of the law than the average person. 
The problems of allowing such a claim to equate to diminished responsibility are 
obvious. But is it not possible to draw a line between people who simply choose to 
commit crimes, and people who meet the criteria for a recognised disorder? 
It could be argued that recognising diminished responsibility in personality 
disorder comes dangerously close to the concept of a ' criminal mind' ; the idea that 
some people, by dint of their basic make up, are more likely to commit crimes. 
The only means of determining whether such a tendency was present would be the 
actual commission of crimes, so a circular logic pervades the whole definition. 
Should people who commit crimes be leniently treated, as they obviously had a 
personal tendency, through no fault of their own, to engage in such behaviour? 
The impossibility of such logic is an insight into why the test for insanity is so strict 
and exclusive. 
Further considerations in this dilemma are, firstly, that the criteria for personality 
disorder are looser than for other conditions, and it is often not difficult to find a 
user friendly psychiatrist who will make the diagnosis on request. Secondly, if a 
plea of mental illness succeeds, the accused usually spends longer locked up than if 
they had been found guilty. Society might paradoxically be safer if a liberal policy 
on reduced responsibility was adopted. 
10. The future of the insanity defence. 
It is notable that the insanity defense in most jurisdictions remains faithful to the 
original principles of the M'Naughten rules, formulated over a hundred and fifty 
years ago. That M'Naughten has stood the test oftime is indisputable, and this 
strongly suggests that radical departures from it are unlikely in the future. 
However, where the subject of reform crops up, there are two recurring themes: 
that the defence should be abolished, or alternatively, that the defence should be 
reserved to the judge at time of sentencing, and not be placed before the jury. 
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The rationale for abolishing the defense arises in part from the acknowledged 
problems with terminology and meaning; where the law can not be clear about its 
terms, and straightforward definitions for concepts like disease of the mind can 
not be formulated, a case can be made for avoiding the whole quagmire entirely by 
abolishing the defence. In further support for this course of action, several other 
points can be made. The insane offender is really no more dangerous to society 
than many entirely sane people who come before the courts every day. In the case 
of sane offenders there is no provision for open ended detainment for society's 
protection, except in the most extreme cases; should the treatment of insane 
offenders be any different? 
It is often assumed that the insanity defence permits deranged offenders to be 
placed in mental institutions instead of prison, where their daily life will be more 
comfortable, and they can receive treatment. In practice, however, this is often not 
the case. Potas 41 presents evidence that around half of people found not guilty by 
reason of insanity serve their detention in ordinary prisons, which, if this continues 
to be true (the figures are around twenty years old) undercuts a large part of the 
rationale for having an insanity defence available. 
The other suggestion regularly mooted is to reserve considerations of mens rea 
and sanity for the sentencing judge, and to use the jury merely to decide whether 
the accused carried out the criminal act or not. The law would provide for a crime 
of unlawful killing, with discretion at sentencing for the presiding judge. The jury 
would hear evidence relating to whether an unlawful killing occurred, and by 
whose hand; only after that decision had been made, would the judge hear 
arguments about the appropriate disposition of the offender. 
The advantage of this course would be to streamline the trial, by not requiring the 
jury to struggle with difficult evidence of sanity and responsibility. The problem is 
that sanity and responsibility are exactly what the jury is there to decide; the 
judgement of one's peers is not a technical exercise to decide who wielded a 
murder weapon, but is intended to encompass the whole wider issue of blame and 
moral culpability. 
11. Conclusion. 
The interface between psychiatry and the law contains some difficult issues, 
probably the most prominent of which are the definitional problems surrounding 
the legal concept of insanity, and its central principle, the problematic disease of 
the mind. 
The imprecision and difficulty of diagnosis in the psychiatric area is a cause of 
tension between the perspectives of the two professions, as one seeks to embrace 
the complexity of the human mind, and the other seeks transparency and 
41 Potas, I. Just Desserts for the Mad. Australian Institute of Criminology, Australia, 1982. 
straightforward answers. In some respects psychiatry has evolved towards the 
legal fraternity ' s position in the last two decades, by relying more on organic 
causation (particularly that which is amenable to drug treatment) than complex 
psychoanalysis, and by adopting internationally standardised definitions. At the 
same time, other areas of the scientific community have been moving in the 
opposite direction, rejecting strict precision and embracing uncertainty. This is a 
boost for psychiatry, which has long operated on such principles, and gives more 
force to the profession' s struggle to interest the law in this perspective. 
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The complexity of psychiatric testimony has also created problems for the 
profession' s public image, and the consequent attitudes adopted by jurors. There is 
a widespread perception that psychiatric testimony leads to criminals being able to 
avoid responsibility and punishment for their crimes, and that the theories of 
erudite boffins lack the common sense of ordinary people. Probably for this reason, 
the insanity defence is rarely invoked, and even more rarely succeeds. 
Almost all English speaking jurisdictions work with the landmark legal test for 
insanity that was first promulgated one hundred and fifty years ago in the House of 
Lords judgement in M'Naughten . 
The central concept of the M 'Naughten rules, as they have been termed, is that a 
' disease of the mind' must be present. It is on this point that the rules face their 
most severe criticism, for no workable definition of what a disease of the mind is 
has been forthcoming from either the medical or the legal professions for the last 
one hundred and fifty years, despite numerous attempts to address the problem. 
It is likely that when the test was first framed, the legal profession was expecting 
that doctors would be able to provide the courts with precise opinions as to when 
mental disease was present, particularly as their knowledge and confidence grew 
with time. This hope has not been fulfilled . No litmus test for disease of the mind 
has been developed, and the understanding of mental illness now available suggests 
that such a narrow approach will be a dead end for the forseeable future . Mental 
disease does not lie in demonstrable abnormalities of the brain or the genes or 
metabolism, but in the behaviour, thoughts, beliefs and experiences of the affected 
person. Such phenomena are highly complex and varied in health, let alone illness, 
and fitting them into a box labeled mental illness for the guidance of the legal 
profession is an unrealistic expectation. 
At various times, the courts have developed several criteria to try and elucidate the 
nature of disease of the mind. All are inadequate, and lead to demonstrably 
perverse conclusions. One is the ' recurrence' test, where a mental condition that is 
likely to recur is more likely to be a disease of the mind, and one that occurs only 
once is not. In fact, serious mental disorders may present only once, and mind 
altering states, like hyperglycemia, that occur in mentally normal people, are prone 
to recur. The second is the ' internal/external' distinction, where conditions arising 
within a person constitute a disease of the mind, while those arising from external 
forces do not. This has lead to some contradictory and hair splitting decisions in 
cases of sleepwalking and diabetes. The sound/unsound mind test is a variation of 
this, and considers how an external force, such as a psychological blow, would 
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affect the mind of an ordinary person. If behaviour in relation to the external force 
is consistent with the reaction of a normal person, a disease of the mind is not 
present. 
What these attempts at definition most forcefully demonstrate is how nebulous the 
concept of disease of the mind actually is, and how neither profession can define 
the concept adequately. There is little prospect of this situation improving, and 
most suggestions for reform concern limiting or abolishing the insanity defence 
entirely. These ideas have never found widespread favour, and it appears inevitable 
the law will have to continue as best it can with the insanity defence as it stands. 
Appendix. 
The number and range of mental illnesses is considerable, but a thumbnail sketch 
of the ones that most commonly come before the courts is provided below. 
The Psychoses. 
A range of disorders in which the key component is impairment in the perception 
ofreality. Schizophrenia is a well known example 42 . Schizophrenia affects around 
one percent of the population, and is characterised by bizarre behaviour, delusional 
beliefs, and hallucinations, usually auditory. It is a gross derangement of normal 
mental function . Some of the most deranged and infamous criminals, like the 
Yorkshire ripper, and the Raurimu gunman, Stephen Anderson, suffered from this 
disorder. 
Depression also fits this category, as severe forms may involve delusional beliefs. 
Mild and moderate depression is a common disorder, and affects around ten 
percent of the population at some stage of life. 
A delusion is a common feature of psychotic illness, particularly that which comes 
before the courts. It is generally held that a delusion is a belief fulfilling four 
conditions: 
- It is fantastic in content, or at least very unlikely; 
- It is not shared by other people of similar background; 
- It is not amenable to reason or experience; 
- It has great personal significance. 
Common delusions are believing oneself to be a famous person, thinking the media 
are broadcasting personal messages, and ascribing fantastic motives to the 
behaviour of other people. 
42 Please note schizophrenia is NOT ' split personality'. 
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The Neuroses. 
A range of disorders such as anxieties, phobias and obsessions, in which 
perception of reality is not impaired, but there are compulsions to bizarre 
behaviour, Such disorders do not usually meet the test for insanity, though some of 
the more extreme ones might do under the volitional criteria. 
Personality disorders. 
Defined in the text of this paper, they represent a considerable definitional problem 
for the law. 
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